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This paper investigates the long-run relationship between trade unionism and productivity
using a panel data set comprising of 18 OECD economies. Much of the existing evidence
on this issue derives from micro-economic studies, with limited attention paid to long-run
dynamics and economy-wide effects. Using the mean group and pooled mean group
estimation techniques on cross-country panel data, the paper offers support to the
“productivity-increasing face of unionism” hypothesis, revealing a positive relationship
between trade union density and per worker output.
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I. Introduction
Research on the productivity effects of unionism over the last two decades
has been lively, offering new insights to the theoretical and empirical
relationship between these two labor market aggregates. Partly inspired by the
controversial work of Freeman and Medoff (1979 and 1984), numerous
empirical studies have examined the extent and direction of the union
* We have benefited from comments by S. Price, G. Agiomirgianakis, J. Temple, conference
participants and an anonymous referee. We are also grateful to E. Stockhammer for making
available to us the dataset used here. V. Monastiriotis acknowledges financial support by
the ESRC (T026271203). All responsibility for errors and omissions lies with the authors.28 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
productivity effects, mainly for the cases of the UK and the USA (e.g., Clark,
1980 and 1984; Hirsch and Link, 1984; Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Nickell et
al., 1992; Denny, 1997; Chezum and Garen, 1998). There is a rather widespread
consensus in the literature about unionism having a negative impact on
productivity and output, although a number of authors have estimated positive
union productivity differentials (Brown and Medoff, 1978; Clark, 1980; Nickell
et al., 1992).
It is standard in this literature to investigate productivity differentials
between unionized vis-à-vis non-unionized firms using industry or firm level
data. Consequently, there is little attention on the economy-wide and dynamic
effects of unionism, while other sources of productivity differentials, like
management strategies and production efficiency, are difficult to be accounted
for and distinguished from the direct union effects.1 There is comparatively little
research on the issue using aggregate national data. Among the few studies, the
OECD (1997) has found evidence of negligible effects of unionism and the
structure of wage bargaining on productivity and productivity growth. Nickell
and Layard (1998) have estimated a negative union effect on growth for a panel
of OECD countries. A negative impact on output or productivity has also been
found by earlier economy-wide studies (deFina, 1983; Lovell et al., 1988).
In this paper we investigate the economy-wide effects of unionism on
productivity at an aggregate level, for a large panel of data. A long time-
series (1960-1992) for 18 OECD countries allows us to investigate the short-
and long-run dynamics of unionism within an economic growth framework,
while controlling for country-specific effects. The source of the data is the
Comparative Welfare States Data Set (Huber et al., 1997), which includes
data from various sources.2In addition to traditional panel data techniques,
we utilize relatively new econometric methods for the estimation of dynamic
1 In a panel study such factors are partly controlled for technically, through the fixed effects
(as factors like managerial strategies and efficiency differentials cannot be taken to have
significant year-to-year variation). In addition to that, estimating productivity effects at the
firm level (and, thus, almost certainly using value-added data) generates problems of
endogeneity and identification, as it is difficult to distinguish between actual productivity
effects and those artificially created due to the known impact that unions have on wages
(see on that Addison and Hirsch, 1989).
2 This dataset was collected by a project entitled “The Welfare State in Comparative
Perspective: Determinants, Program Characteristics, and Outcomes,” with the financial29 WHAT DO UNIONS DO AT THE LARGE SCALE?
panel models. Having a set of 576 observations, we use an auto-regressive
distributed lags (ARDL) specification to identify a common-across-countries
long-run coefficient for the union productivity effects, while allowing different
short-run dynamics for each country. Hence, our estimates are largely unbiased
from any business cycle and country-specific effects. Apart from the relative
novelty of the applied econometric methodology, our investigation of union
productivity effects based on a large panel of data and controlling for short-
run dynamics and country-specific effects is to our knowledge unique.
In the next section we make some theoretical considerations and derive an
estimating model. Sections III and IV present the empirical results. In section
III we apply traditional econometric techniques, while in section IV we briefly
present and consequently apply the dynamic panel data methodologies. The
final section summarizes the results and concludes.
II. A Model of Changes in Unionization Rates and Productivity
Growth
Union productivity differentials can arise through a variety of mechanisms.
At a firm-level, unionism can affect the organization and efficiency of
production, the pace of technological innovation and capital accumulation,
training and manning levels and so forth (Metcalf, 1988; Machin and
Wadhwani, 1991a). At a wider level, it can impact upon average wages and
wage inflation, with further effects on inflation, interest rates, investment and
output growth, as well as on national comparative advantages and international
trade (OECD, 1995).
support from the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research (now Institute for Policy
Research) at Northwestern University in 1989-90, the National Science Foundation in
1990-92, and the support in 1992-97 by the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern
University and by the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, the Department of
Political Science, and the Morehead Alumni Chair held by Evelyne Huber, University of
North Carolina. No follow-up study to update this dataset has been designed to date. The
original data sources are: for employment, OECD Labour Force Statistics (various years);
for union membership figures, Visser (1996); and for GDP and investment, Penn World
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Theoretically, negative union productivity effects can be assumed if unions
impose rigidities in the introduction of new technologies and working practices,
or if they reduce investment (Pencavel, 1977; Addison and Hirsch, 1989;
Machin and Wadhwani, 1991b). On the other hand, unions can increase
workers’ participation and involvement and, hence, production efficiency
while, by putting upward pressures on labor costs, they can foster innovation
and quality-based competition from the side of management (Booth and
Chatterji, 1998). Traditionally, however, a more direct effect of unionism is
assumed, as the latter can impact directly upon the productivity of the
individual workers. In this case it is the marginal product of labor that differs
between unionized vis-à-vis non-unionized workers. It must be noted, however,
that in a production-function approach like the one employed here and despite
their theoretical distance, all these mechanisms exhibit some practical
equivalence, both in technical and empirical terms.
In building our model we follow Brown and Medoff (1978) assuming that
both unionized and non-unionized labor has the same coefficient in the
production function, with the coefficient for unionized labor being discounted
by a factor f which reflects productivity differences:
                                                                                                                    (1)
where the standard notation is used with the exception that Lu is unionized
labor and Ln is non-unionized labor.3The coefficient f can be greater or smaller
than unity, implying higher or smaller productivity of unionized labor,
respectively. By adding and subtracting Lu in (1) and further manipulating,
we get:
                                                                                                                    (2)
or, taking logs and using log(1+x) » x,
                                                                                                                    (3)
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3  In this model, total factor productivity (TFP) is a function of time of the form A(t)=A(0)egt,
where g is the growth rate of TFP.
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where lower case letters denote logarithms, g = b(f -1) and TUD = Lu /L is
trade union density. Thus, productivity growth will be a function of changes
in union density:
                                                                                                                     (4)
Equation (4) associates productivity growth with changes in trade union
density. According to our theoretical model, this relationship derives directly
from the level of efficiency of unionized labor (the coefficient f, which can
have any sign) and is thus not conditioned on either union strength or any
scale effects (e.g., firm size or capital intensity). This is an important
observation, especially concerning the interpretation of the results and their
policy implications.
In our empirical analysis we proxy capital growth with the share of
investment to GDP.4 With this modification, (4) is our main estimating model,
relating productivity growth to the share of investment to GDP, employment
growth and changes in union density.5In the traditional panel estimation
techniques (section III) the one- and two-way error component (de-meaned)
and dummy variables (DVLS) transformations of this specification are used
(see Baltagi, 1995, for a detailed exposition of these methods). In section IV
we estimate the above specification using the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled
Mean Group (PMG) estimators with a dynamic ECM equation that has (4) as
a long-run solution.
The model specification and estimation methods help wipe out influences
that are not of direct interest. More precisely, both the traditional and dynamic
panel data specifications control for constant-over-time factors (like country-
specific differences in managerial strategies), while the dynamic specification
of (4) helps remove much of the influence of factors that exhibit temporal
persistence (like country differences in production efficiency).
() (1 ) yl a k l T U D ab g D-=+ D + -D + D
4  Data availability was the reason for using this approximation, since using the capital
series available would shorten significantly the time-dimension of our sample and, hence,
generate problems in the application of the MG and PMG estimations on the ARLD
specification.
5 We focus on the dynamic specification given in (4) because of the non-stationarity of the
data. As we discuss in section IV, our series are all difference-stationary (I(1)).32 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. Trade Unionism and Productivity
Our empirical investigation uses the production-function model developed
above to measure the long-run relationship between union density and
productivity. Before presenting our econometric analysis, it is useful to look
at some stylized facts.
A. Stylized Facts
Country differences in unionization rates are quite remarkable, exhibiting
a range of over 60% in the 1980s and 1990s. Such differences clearly reflect
country differences in labor market institutions, historical traditions and
cultural characteristics, attitudes towards specific aspects of work and so
forth.6 In our sample, unionization rates vary from 7% in France and 14% in
the USA in 1992, to 88% in Switzerland and 81% in Finland in the same
year.7
However, and although cross-country differences in unionization rates are
very large, substantial within-countries temporal variations also exist and
should not go unnoticed, as many countries have experienced significant
trends in unionization rates. For example, unionization in the UK dropped
from around 50% in the 1960s to just over a third in 1992. On the other
hand, in Finland and Italy unionization rates more than doubled in the 32-
year period of our sample, while significant and almost linear increases were
experienced also in Denmark and Sweden. In some countries (France, Ireland,
Holland, UK and USA) a structural break can be observed, possibly related
6 We do not want to enter into a discussion of the determinants of unionization and union
formation, as these constitute an almost separate body of literature. Specifically for a
literature on the economic history of trade unions see Booth (1995) and references given
there.
7 It must be noted that for many countries union densities do not reflect the same conditions
in labor relations. Thus, although French union densities are comparable to those of the
USA, union coverage in France is as high as 80%, and thus France has a more rigid wage
bargaining system. Although such factors should be kept in mind when considering the
stylized facts, they do not influence the econometric analysis and are thus not reflected in
the conclusions drawn.33 WHAT DO UNIONS DO AT THE LARGE SCALE?
to significant political and economic events (e.g., the oil shocks of the 1970s
in the USA, or Thatcher governments in the UK).8
Thus, overall, a wealthy degree of variation in unionization rates exists in
both dimensions of our sample. In the same manner, a significant cross-country
and temporal variation is evident in the case of labor productivity, as there are
notable country differences in both the timing of the business cycle and in
their study-state productivity levels. However, an interesting trend seems to
be noticeable regarding the productivity-unionization country-specific
experiences. Among the nine of our sample countries that experienced an
overall decline in union densities between the years 1962 and 1992, only two
(Austria and France) did not have below-average rates of long-run productivity
growth. In contrast, five out of the seven countries that experienced prolonged
periods of union growth (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan
and Sweden) also had above-average rates of productivity growth (annualized
average growth rates over the 32-year period).
It is possible that temporal evolutions in productivity and union densities
are interrelated due to the effect of external shocks, as is for example the oil
shocks of the 1970s.9 In such a case, spurious results could be obtained due
to prima facie causality. Although our error correction panel data methodology
helps avoid the problems related to the possible presence of deterministic
shifts and persistent country differences, we examined the extent to which
external shocks could be influencing our results by splitting our sample into
three characteristic periods: the 1960s up to the oil shocks; the 1970s up to
the start of the Reagan/Thatcher era; and the 1980s up to the collapse of the
socialist states.10
8 These cross-country differences and within-country evolutions in unionization lead to a
particularly low persistence figure (especially when considering that unionism is primarily
a social phenomenon), with a Spearman rank correlation coefficient for our sample countries
between 1962 and 1992 just above 60%.
9 For example, that union densities declined after the productivity slowdown that followed
the oil shocks. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this.
10 As another robustness check of the stylized facts, a preliminary single-dimensional analysis
(i.e., either cross-country or time-series regressions) was undertaken. Based on the model
given in (4), we run one regression for each cross-sectional layer (year) and for each time-
series layer (country) of our sample. The coefficients obtained for the unionization variable34 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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In the three panels of Figure 1 we present the average change in union
density and the average productivity growth across our sample countries for
these three periods. As can be seen, there is significant cross-country variation
in both productivity and union densities in all sub-periods under consideration.
Moreover, the decline in productivity growth in the 1970s (middle panel) is
not accompanied by an equally dramatic decline in union growth. In contrast,
union growth declined much faster in the 1980s (bottom panel), when
productivity growth was recovering in almost all our sample countries. Thus,
it seems that the factors determining long-run shifts in productivity and union
densities are not identical, especially as the latter are more directly influenced
by shifts in the dominant political ideology.
B. Traditional Panel Data Analysis
Our traditional panel data analysis examined a range of alternative
econometric specifications, allowing for fixed, random, country- and time-
specific effects and using both one- and two-way error component
specifications. The results are presented in Table 1. The union coefficient is
significant in all cases with the exception of the time random effects model
(second last column), which performs very poorly (implying that the time
effects are fixed and not random). However, all specification tests show both
time and country effects to be significant, thus suggesting a two-way error
component model (last column).
This last model suggests that the net effect of unionism on productivity,
controlling for time and country specific effects, has been positive in the
three decades and for the 18 countries of our sample. The interpretation of
the theoretical model in (4) suggests that unionized labor has -other things
equal- been by around 19.2% (= 0.214/1.115) more productive than non-
unionized labor.11 The coefficients on the capital and labor variables have the
were quite stable in the cross-country regressions (over the years), but less so in the time-
series regressions (among countries). Overall, the results obtained were rather poor, thus
our interest to the panel dimension of our sample.
11 We also experimented with a slightly simpler model, where the capital growth variable






























Table 1.  Pooled Regressions on Productivity Growth
Model NE CFE (1) CFE (2) TFE CRE TRE (C/T)FE
Investment share 0.145 * 0.171 * 0.171 * 0.127 * 0.157 * 0.135 ** 0.129 *
Employment growth 0.149 ** 0.222 * 0.222 * 0.034 0.201 * -0.774 *** 0.115 **
Change in union density 0.166 *** 0.191 ** 0.191 ** 0.168 ** 0.186 ** -0.428 0.214 *
Brausch-Pagan test --- --- 4.19 * --- 59.17 * --- ---
Hausman test --- --- --- --- 11.07 ** --- ---
F-test (year dummies) --- --- --- 7.14 * --- --- 7.60 *
F-test (country dummies) --- 4.28 * --- --- --- --- 5.29*
F-test (y + c dummies) --- --- --- --- --- --- 7.13 *
R-squared 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.44
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The Brausch-Pagan and  Hausman tests are c2 tests for the significance
of random effects (against no effects and fixed effects, respectively). The abbreviations in the head of the Table are as follows (estimation method
in parenthesis): NE, pooled regressions with no controls for any effects (OLS); CFE (1), country fixed effects (DVLS); CFE (2), country fixed
effects (GLS); TFE, time fixed effects (DVLS); CRE, country random effects (GLS); TRE, time random effects (GLS); and (C/T)FE, two-way
error component model with both time and country fixed effects (DVLS). Instead of the B-P test, an F-test for zero variance of the random effects
is used in the CFE (2) model.37 WHAT DO UNIONS DO AT THE LARGE SCALE?
the effect operating through investment, in addition to the direct productivity effect). The
two-way error component model in this specification returned a figure only slightly different
(N = 0.235/1.149 = 20%).
12 On the other hand, the country-specific effects are always highly significant, suggesting
large cross-country differences in productivity growth. It is interesting to investigate further
these differences, in order to examine an alternative route via which unionism can impact
on productivity. One plausible hypothesis is that unexplained productivity growth
differentials might be due to differences in the strategies employed nationally by trade
unions and in the structure of wage bargaining (centralization and co-ordination) in each
country. To test for that, we examined the relationship between the estimated country fixed
effects and some indicators of union co-ordination and centralization of wage bargaining,
produced by the OECD (1997). Correlation analysis between these variables returned a
statistically significant correlation coefficient of 0.34, suggesting that after controlling for
cross-country differences in unionism and factor inputs, productivity growth is lower in
countries with more rigid wage bargaining structures.
expected signs and are significant. Moreover, the results are very stable across
the different specifications. The results from the traditional analysis on the
panel seem to suggest that unionism enhances labor productivity.12
IV. Robustness of the Empirical Findings
The positive relationship between unionism and productivity identified
above requires further investigation, since the data used here have complex
dynamics and are characterized by strong trends and non-stationarity. This
relationship could be governed by country-specific long- or short-run
dynamics, which the traditional pooled estimators cannot estimate. Therefore,
these methods might not be appropriate in our case. New estimation techniques
are now available in the literature, that allow such effects to be controlled for
and measured.
A. The MG and PMG Estimation Methodology
It has become conventional to view long-run parameters as reflecting
cointegrating relationships among a set of I(1) variables. The standard
methodology in such cases first establishes the order of integration of the
variables in question, and then - having established that the variables are of38 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
13 In our analysis the GDP, Investment, Employment and Union Density variables are
clearly trended for all countries and can be assumed to be I(1), hence become stationary
after first differencing (productivity and employment growth, changes in union density) or
taking their ratio (investment share).
the same order of integration - tests whether there is at least one linear
relationship among these variables.
Our analysis follows a different approach. This can be justified by two
facts. First, there are only a few (and even fewer statistically satisfactory)
tests of cointegration in a panel data context, while it is also well known that
tests of order of integration in panel data do not reliably distinguish between
series that contain a unit root and those that are stationary with a near-unit
root. Second, long-run parameters may be consistently estimated using the
traditional autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) approach (Pesaran and Shin,
1998). Moreover, as Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) have shown, this approach
yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the long-run
coefficients irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0).13
Further, it compares favorably in Monte Carlo experiments with conventional
methods of cointegration analysis.
Therefore, our estimates were obtained using two recently developed
methods for the statistical analysis of dynamic panel data: the Mean Group
(MG) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation. These methods are
particularly suited to the analysis of panels with large time and cross-section
dimensions. MG estimation derives the long-run parameters for the panel
from an average of the long-run parameters from ARDL models for individual
countries. For example, if the ARDL is the following
                                                                                                                    (5)
for country i = 1,….,N, then the long-run parameter for country i is
                                                                                                                    (6)
and the MG estimator for the whole panel will be given by
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It can be shown that MG estimation with sufficiently high lag orders yields
super-consistent estimators of the long-run parameters even when the
regressors are I(1) (see Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999).
The PMG method of estimation, introduced by Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(1999) occupies an intermediate position between the MG method, in which
both the slopes and the intercepts are allowed to differ across country, and the
standard fixed effects method, in which the slopes are fixed and the intercepts
are allowed to vary. In PMG estimation, only the long-run coefficients are
constrained to be the same across countries, while the short-run coefficients
are allowed to vary.
Setting this out more precisely, the unrestricted specification for the ARDL
system of equations for t = 1,2,…T time periods and i = 1,2,…N countries for
the dependent variable y is
                                                                                                       (8)
where xij is the (k´1) vector of explanatory variables for group i and mi
represents the fixed effects. In principle the panel can be unbalanced and m
and n may vary across countries. This model can be re-parameterized as a
VECM system
                                                                                                               (9)
where bi s are the long-run parameters and qi s are the error correction param-
eters. The pooled group restriction is that the elements of b are common
across countries, so that
                                                                                    (10)
All the dynamics and the ECM terms are free to vary. Estimation of this
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assumptions, the parameter estimates of this model are consistent and
asymptotically normal for both stationary and non-stationary I(1) regressors.
Both MG and PMG estimations require selecting the appropriate lag length
for the individual country equations. This selection was made using the
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.
B. The MG and PMG Estimation Results
Initially we estimated the model given in (4) assuming that all of the long
run coefficients are the same across countries. The estimation results from
the MG and PMG methods are presented in Table 2. The PMG estimates
provide further supportive evidence to our previous finding of a strong positive
relationship between changes in unionization and productivity growth, while
the MG results are in the same line but less strongly so. The investment share
has the expected sign, which for the PMG model is highly significant. The
growth of employment has again a positive estimated effect, but this is
insignificant in the PMG estimation, with the implication that labor
productivity is constant across different employment levels. Although the
Hausman test for the poolability of this coefficient is rejected, for both the
unionism variable and investment as a share of GDP the pooling restrictions
cannot be rejected (the p-value is 0.32 for both cases). Moreover, the joint
Hausman test suggests that the PMG results are more appropriate than the
MG ones.
Overall, the results obtained from the ARDL specifications are highly
consistent to the ones derived from the more traditional methods. The estimated
effect of unionization changes on productivity growth suggests that the
discount factor for unionized labor, f, is equal to 1.21, or that unionized labor
is 21% more productive than non-unionized labor. This result is very similar
to the one obtained from the two-way error component model of Table 1. The
estimated returns to capital are also very similar to the ones obtained earlier.
Further, restricting the coefficient of unionism to be the same in all countries
but removing this restriction for the other two coefficients does not affect
significantly our main conclusions (Table 3). Again the unionism coefficient
is positive and significant for the PMG estimates (which are again approved
by the Hausman test for poolability), while now both coefficients for41 WHAT DO UNIONS DO AT THE LARGE SCALE?
investment share and employment growth become insignificant. Alternative
estimates -not reported here for economy of space- restricting subsets of the
long-run coefficients gave similar results to those initially obtained.14 The
employment growth coefficient verifies the constant returns to scale long run
effect of employment on labor productivity, which was not captured in the
traditional estimation methods that did not control for the short-run dynamics.
For capital growth, the insignificant result strengthens our earlier conclusion
about the poolability of this coefficient. Further, this time the union productivity
effect is again equal to 19%.
It need to be noted here that our results were very stable also across different
subsets of our sample, which we investigated in order to control for country
differences in the regulatory framework of unionism and for a possible
structural break in the relationship under investigation around the 1970s. In
particular, we re-run equation (4) for the following sub-samples. First, we
excluded France and Italy (two countries with a large disparity between union
density and union coverage) in order to assure that our results are not sensitive
14 Tables and results are available from authors upon request.
Table 2. Pooled Mean Group and Mean Group Estimates (Restricted)
            Model PMG Estimates MG Estimates Hausman Test
Investment share 0.143 * 0.066 0.93
Employment growth 0.025 0.233 * 4.26 **
Change in union density 0.214 ** 0.317 *** 1.02
Error correction coefficient -0.999* -0.988 * ---
Joint Hausman test --- --- 5.33
Notes: *,  **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Short-run
coefficients not reported for economy of space. The maximum number of time periods and
countries are 32 and 18, respectively. SBC (Schwarz) has been used to select the lag orders
for each group. All the long-run parameters have been restricted to be the same across
groups. The mean group estimates have been used as initial estimate(s) of the long-run
parameter(s) for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation.42 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 3. Pooled Mean Group and Mean Group Estimates (Unrestricted)
  Model PMG Estimates MG Estimates Hausman Test
                                         Unrestricted long-run coefficients
Investment share 0.056 0.057 ---
Employment growth 0.132 0.248 ** ---
Restricted coefficient (long-run coefficient same across countries)
Change in union density 0.214 * 0.417 ** 0.71
Error correction coefficient -0.999* -0.988 * ---
Notes: * and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively. Short-run coefficients not
reported for economy of space. The maximum number of time periods and countries are 32
and 18, respectively. SBC (Schwarz) has been used to select the lag orders for each group.
The mean group estimates have been used as initial estimate(s) of the long-run parameter(s)
for the pooled maximum likelihood estimation.
to such disparities. The union effect remained statistically significant,
increasing only slightly, to 19.7%. Second, we split our sample into two groups
(one including Central European and Scandinavian countries and one including
all the rest), to examine the impact of country differences in union co-ordination
regimes. The results were again very stable, with the union effect at 22.0%
(albeit marginally insignificant) in the Scandinavian sub-sample and at 18.8%
in the remaining group. Finally, despite the restrictions induced by the
estimating method, we also split the sample into two sub-periods (overlapping
1961-1979 and 1975-1992). Again the results were very stable, with a union
effect of 14.1% in the 1970s and of 17.2% (albeit marginally insignificant) in
the 1980s.
Admittedly, productivity differentials of magnitude close to 20% are at
the margin of plausibility if one assumes that the union productivity effects
are solely activated through workers’ performance (Brown and Medoff, 1978).
Hence, an explanation suggesting that union productivity effects are activated
through a number of plausible mediating factors (production efficiency,
capacity utilization and the extent of labor hoarding being but a few) cannot
be ruled out. More significantly, one cannot rule out the possibility that part43 WHAT DO UNIONS DO AT THE LARGE SCALE?
of the estimated effect is due to union-imposed wage increases, as
institutionally set wages can have a spurious effect on the estimation of the
marginal product of labor in a production-function approach. However, it
must be noted that the empirical literature suggests union/non-union wage
differentials in the area of 10% (Blanchflower, 1984; Wilson and Cable, 1991;
Blackaby et al., 1999), half of our estimated union productivity effect.15 In
any case, the overall productivity effect of unionism is robustly found to have
been significantly non-negative in the three decades and for the 18 countries
of our sample.
V. Conclusions
The productivity effect of unionism is an issue extensively studied,
especially at the micro-level, using firm and industry data. Despite the
theoretical controversy on the issue, most micro-economic studies have
provided evidence of a negative productivity effect of unionism, although
exceptions do exist. Time-series analysis on the issue is rather scarce, with
the implication that the dynamics of the relationship at question have been
relatively overlooked. This is not a minor problem, as it is possible for the
union effects to be significantly different at different economic levels, in the
sense that what holds for an individual firm might not be true for the economy
as a whole, especially if there are dynamics operating at scales wider than the
firm or the industry (e.g., multiplier effects and agglomeration economies).
Additionally, most of the empirical evidence is based on Anglo-Saxon data,
with few international (cross-country) studies.
Attempting to partially fill this gap, in this paper we examined the long-
and short-run relationship between unionism and productivity using a panel
of 18 OECD countries over a 32-year period. Our empirical investigation
15 Another possibility for spurious results is if unionized workers have more human capital,
a factor not controlled for in the empirical analysis. Although there is little evidence in
either direction regarding this possibility, tentatively one has to assume that unionized
labor is at least not more human-capital-abundant than non-unionized labor. Empirical
evidence suggests that returns to human capital are higher in non-unionized environments,
which could imply a direct motivation for high-skill workers not to unionize, or a disincentive
for unionized workers to invest in skills acquisition (Battu et al., 2002).44 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
was based on a standard theoretical model, which at the individual level
identifies unionized workers as a separate factor of production and thus at the
aggregate level it associates union density with productivity through the
difference in the marginal product of unionized and non-unionized labor. Our
results provide robust evidence of a positive impact of union status on
individual workers’ productivity and thus of union density on aggregate labor
productivity.
Preliminary time-series and cross-country analyses revealed that the
relationship under investigation has been different among countries and over
time. Controlling for possible time and country-specific effects, the panel
data analyses allowed the estimation of a common across countries long-run
coefficient. The good performance of our regressions and the stability of our
results, we interpret as evidence in support of the appropriateness of the
econometric approach employed. Both the long- and short-run effects are
positive and statistically significant (and they remain so across a number of
alternative specifications and for different subsets of our two-dimensional
sample), although we also show that residual productivity growth might be
adversely affected by centralized wage bargaining structures.16
The disparity between the macroeconomic results presented here and the
findings obtained from microeconomic studies elsewhere in the literature
forces us to conclude that the economy-wide effects of unionism are
structurally different to its firm-level effects. Further research along the lines
of this paper would undoubtedly be useful in providing additional evidence
on this, as such an assumption has significant implications for labor market
and national economic policies.
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